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Local Public Health Units play a key role in mitigating the spread of infectious diseases.  
The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity to leverage the prevalent information 
communication technologies including social media to communicate with citizens.  The 
aim of this research paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of how methods and 
content of communication practices across Ontario Public Health Units have differed 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and explore possible reasons why.  Due to the nature of 
this research being exploratory, a Grounded Theory approach was used.  Content 
analysis included a systematic review of 10 of the 34 public health units’ social media 
information.  Four communication-related themes emerged: engagement/bidirectional 
exchange with citizens, use of data to establish trust, localized response based on 
COVID-19 prevalence rates, and message alignment with other levels of government.  
Findings show that some of this variation can be explained due to differences in 
administrative structure (autonomous vs regional/single-tier), rural/urban environment, 
COVID-19 prevalence differences and time.  These findings do not unilaterally show 
autonomous public health units are able to carry out their functions better.  However, 
the existence of variation among communication methods and content between differing 
administrative structures and varying rural/urban environments indicate that these 
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The importance of communication in mitigating health crisis is best described by the late 
Dr. Jong-wook Lee, Director General for World Health Organization in 2004, following 
SARS when he said “we have had great success in the [last] five years in controlling 
outbreaks, but we have only recently come to understand that communications are as 
critical to outbreak control as laboratory analyses or epidemiology.”  As Dr. Lee 
identifies, effective communication is a key tool in the prevention and management of 
infectious disease outbreaks.  In fact, risk communication has been identified as a core 
competency for guiding public health responses to infectious disease threats. (Dickman, 
Apfel, & Gottschalk, 2016).  In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) also 
known as COVID-19 as a pandemic.  Due to the delayed symptoms combined with 
higher infection possibility, containing COVID-19 requires radical behavior change of the 
human population.  For the first time on a global scale since the 1918 Influenza, public 
health recommendations included social distancing, wearing masks and limiting non-
essential trips outside of one’s home.  Since 1918 however, internet and mobile 
communication have become the dominant medium of communication.  In fact, the 
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications (CRTC) organization, the 
independent public authority in charge of regulating and supervising Canadian 
broadcasting and telecommunications, declared broadband internet access a basic 
service in 2016 (CBC, 2016).  This provides public health authorities the opportunity to 
use information in new and innovative ways to incentivize desired behavior.  In what 
ways do the Ontario Local Public Health Units leverage the new and prevalent 
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information technology methods to provide communication? Are the methods and 
content same or different among the different public health units?  Why might this be 
so?  This research seeks to explore if there is a relationship between differences in 
administrative structure, rural/urban make-up, prevalence of COVID-19 etc. and 
communication characteristics. 
The aim of this research paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of how and why 
methods and content of communication practices across Ontario Public Health Units 
have differed during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Due to the nature of this research being 
exploratory, a Grounded Theory approach was used.  Content analysis included a 
methodological review of 10 of the 34 public health units’ website and social media 
information.  Four communication-related themes emerged: engagement/bidirectional 
exchange with citizens, use of data to establish trust, localized response based on 
COVID-19 prevalence rates, and message alignment with other levels of government.  
Findings show that some of this variation can be explained by administrative structure 
(autonomous vs regional/single-tier), rural/urban environment, COVID-19 prevalence 
differences and time.   
This paper is composed of five sections: (1) a background including a brief history of 
municipal public health in Ontario and high-level timeline of COVID-19 to-date; (2) a 
literature review that includes public health governance in Ontario, local health 
authorities communication role during emergencies, and goals of risk communication; 





Information has always been used as a tool by government; however, new opportunities 
for direct communication with the public are now available.  Access to internet and 
mobile technologies are available to a large percentage of the population; this provides 
new avenues for communication with the public.  Unlike in the past, where only 
broadcast technologies were available to government, internet allows for real time two-
way communication, thus allowing for communications to play a critical role in 
responding to the pandemic.  Data including data analysis and data visualization is 
currently an integral part of decision making and can act as a communication source.  
Online communication tools such as social media allow for a radical shift from 
unidirectional and static information flow from government/public health officials to 
interactive, bidirectional communication between government and citizens.  Since this 
study focuses on information available through the internet, it provides an opportunity to 
analyze how these tools can be leveraged by local public health units. 
In Ontario, the provincial government, under the leadership of Premier Doug Ford, is 
considering making drastic changes to public health under an initiative to “update and 
improve public health in Ontario” and is calling this initiative “Public Health 
Modernization”.  This includes a significant cut in the public health funding model as well 
as consideration of amalgamating the 34 public health units into 10.  The paradox of 
public health is that when it is working, it is invisible.  The unique situation of the 
pandemic brings visibility and spotlight to the critical functions of local public health 
units.  The discussion paper for Public Health Modernization authored by the Ministry of 
Health highlights discrepancies and inefficiencies amongst the public health units: 
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There is currently a disconnect amongst evidence products, policy and delivery 
among public health units.  In 2017, the Auditor General reported that public 
health units are poorly coordinated and duplicating work.  It notes, “Significant 
inefficiencies exist across the public health units because there are limited formal 
systems in place to co-ordinate their activities and share best practices” (Ontario 
Ministry of Health, 2019). 
This highlights that differences exist among the public health units and there is limited 
coordination and sharing of best practices.  Thus, it is expected that there is 
considerable communication practice variation among the local public health units.  
Understanding the variation and possible reasons for these differences will help to 
inform Ford government’s health unit restructuring decision-making.  Possible reasons 
for these differences will also be investigated.  To that end, certain communication 
attributes and it’s correlation with administrative structure, urban/rural, and COVID-19 
prevalence rates will be analyzed.   
Background 
An understanding of brief history of municipal public health in Ontario as well as a high-
level timeline of COVID-19 pandemic to-date will help to provide context to the study.  
Brief History of Municipal Public Health in Ontario 
Municipal Public Health began in pre-confederation Canada.  In 1833, the Legislature of 
Upper Canada passed an Act that allowed local municipalities to establish boards of 
health to combat contagious and infectious diseases.  
One of the first implementations by public health was called the Sanitary Reform 
Movement.  It was developed in England in the 1830s and ‘40s and focused on 




The Sanitary Reform Movement had an agenda with several essential objectives.  Rutty 
& Sullivan (2010) describe these objectives: 
[T]he gathering of information on mortality and morbidity levels in order to 
understand and measure public health problems; activists who could publicize 
this type of information in order to mobilize public and professional opinion; and 
the existence of a municipal infrastructure sophisticated enough to be able to 
implement and enforce legislated reforms (Rutty & Sullivan, 2010). 
These Sanitary Reform Movement objectives remain relevant today as the gathering 
and sharing of information and public health agencies’ ability to implement and enforce 
measures remain critical functions of public health. 
In 1871, a smallpox outbreak devastated the world. Based on British and American 
legislative and administrative precedents, the federal and provincial governments in 
Ontario encouraged local boards of health and made it mandatory to have a medical 
health officer.  The work of the local boards of health was carried out by the public 
health unit.  A ‘public health unit’ is an “official health agency established by a group of 
urban and rural municipalities to provide a more efficient community health program, 
carried out by full-time, specially qualified staff”  (Ontario Ministry of Health, 2020).   The 
province only had central board of health during “grave emergencies”; at all other times, 
the power and responsibility of Ontario’s health needs were vested in their local 
authorities. 
By 1884, over 400 boards of health were in operation in Ontario.  By 1934, there were 
800 local boards of health and 700 (mostly part-time) medical officers of health.  In 
1967, changes to the Public Health Act required full-time public health services.  In an 
effort to establish economies of scale, optimum population sizes for health unit 
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catchment areas were established leading to the concept of “district” health units.  
Nudged by the province, health units regrouped on a multi-county basis to become 
more efficient.  By 1998, following the City of Toronto amalgamation, there were 37 
public health units.  Today, after minor mergers including as recent as early 2020, there 
are 34 public health units in Ontario (Association of Local Public Health Agencies, 
2020).  Recent discussions of reducing the number of public health units from 34 to 10 
cited similar reasons as in the late 1960s, “economies of scale”, “back-office functions,” 
and “better-coordinated action by public health units” (Izenberg, 2019).   
There is a long-term trend towards reduction in numbers of public health units.  The 
provincial government, under the leadership of Premier Doug Ford, seems set to 
continue this trend via ‘Public Health Modernization’.  This initiative seeks to further 
reduce 34 public health units into 10.  Is this amalgamating too far?  An understanding 
of differences in communication among the public health units, and delving into possible 
explanations for these differences may help to inform this decision-making. 
COVID-19 High-Level Timeline of Events To-Date 
On December 31st, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) came to know about a 
possible “atypical pneumonia-like cases reported in Wuhan, China”.  On January 3, 
2020, WHO issued public warnings over Twitter regarding a “cluster of pneumonia 
cases in Wuhan”…but reassured that “China has extensive capacity to respond…” On 
January 22, WHO confirms human-to-human transmission and Wuhan closes down 
public transportation.  Meanwhile in Canada, travelers are asked to voluntarily isolate 
for 14 days.  Although WHO emergency committee members met on January 23rd, it 
was decided not to declare COVID-19 a “Public Health Emergency of International 
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Concern” at that time.  On January 27, Canada confirms its first case of COVID-19.  The 
first case is related to travel from Wuhan, China.  Until March 11, 2020 when WHO 
declared the global outbreak of COVID-19 a pandemic, Canada had very few 
restrictions aside from screenings at the airport and the 14-day voluntary isolation for 
recent travelers. By mid-March, the Canadian border was closed to all non-essential 
travel including US.  In addition, the Province of Ontario and numerous municipalities 
within Ontario declared a ‘State of Emergency’ and advised lock downs.  All publicly 
funded schools (elementary and secondary) were shut down.  Although initially this was 
for “two weeks after March Break until April 5th”, students did not return to school for the 
remainder of the school year.  Ontarians were advised to “social distance” which 
included maintaining a physical distance of a minimum of 2 meters apart from anyone 
who they did not live with.  This messaging was repeated and reinforced by various 
media and social media channels.  This was in place for numerous weeks until mid-
June when Ontario allowed for “social bubbles” – meaning you can interact with up to 
10 people.  In addition, Ontario started Phase 2 of re-opening meaning some 
businesses can start to reopen (Edmonton Journal, 2020).  During phase 2, Ontarians 
were advised to wear masks in enclosed spaces (e.g. grocery stores, restaurants, etc.).  
The early response to COVID-19 was mainly focused at federal and provincial levels.  
However, as COVID-19 progressed and especially as re-opening was being considered, 
response and communication strategies changed towards a local focus.   
Literature Review 
To better understand how differences in administrative structure, rural/urban make-up, 
locality and prevalence of COVID-19 may be related to differences in communication 
8 
 
characteristics of public health units, it is important to understand health governance in 
Ontario, the role of local public health units during emergencies and the goals of risk 
communication.  A review of the literature covers these topics.   
Multilevel Governance/Intergovernmental Relations 
Health is governed at various levels internationally, federally, provincially and locally as 
shown in Figure 1.  At an international level, health is governed through World Health 
Organization (WHO).  WHO is an agency of the United Nations responsible for 
international public health and includes “advocating for universal healthcare, monitoring 
public health risks, coordinating responses to health emergencies, promoting human 
health and well-being…set international health standards and guidelines, and collects 
data on global health issues” (World Health Organization, 2020).    At the national level, 
Health Canada is responsible for public health related decisions, under the leadership of 
the Medical Officer of Canada.  Provincially, there are two bodies supporting health -
Ministry of Health and Public Health Ontario.  Ministry of Health provides direction and 
guidance to support population health and ensuring delivery of quality health services.  
Public Health Ontario provides scientific and technical advice and operational support.  
They also provides laboratory services to the public health field.  Locally, public health 
falls under the local public health authority or public health units under the leadership of 
the Medical Officer of Health.  Understanding this relationship is important for at least 
two reasons – one is to see if some of the information that is presented publicly at the 
local level is mandated or recommended by the province or higher levels, and the other 
is to see alignment in regards to the information presented by local boards of health with 




Figure 1: Multilevel Governance of Health 
 
Local Public Health Units in Ontario 
The focus of this paper is the local public health units.  Local public health units are 
required to deliver mandated public health programs and services as described in the 
Ontario Public Health Standards including but not limited to, food safety, infectious and 
communicable disease prevention and control, healthy growth and development, 
immunization, safe water, school health, chronic disease prevention as well as 
monitoring population health data and managing outbreaks.  There are 34 public health 
units - a majority, 22 units, are autonomous meaning that they are “specialized 
jurisdictions” that are separate from the municipal government and the remaining 12 are 
tied to municipal “general purpose” government.  Autonomous public health units’ 
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highest level of administrative authority is typically the Medical Officer of Health, who 
report to the board of health.  The board of health for autonomous units is comprised of 
municipal and provincial appointees.  For public health units integrated with municipal 
government, the Medical Officer of Health often reports (ultimately) to the city manager 
or CAO and the governing body is typically council.  Ministry of Health’s Discussion 
Paper on Public Health Modernization (2019) states that “the variation in public health 
unit’s governance and leadership models may contribute to inconsistent priority setting.”  
The discussion paper also states that some public health units are too small to have the 
minimum amount of resources, expertise and capacity needed to deliver all programs 
and services (critical mass) and to meet unexpected surges in demand (surge capacity).  
In addition, the SARS Commission: Volume 5 SARS and Public Health Legislation, 
Second Interim Report (2006) advised that Medical Officers of Health requires 
independence from political and bureaucratic pressures.  In addition, these public health 
units can cover urban/rural mix (e.g. Region of Waterloo Public Health), a mostly rural 
geographic area (e.g. Sudbury & District Health Unit) or a mostly urban geographic area 
(such as in the Greater Toronto Hamilton Area).  The “Ontario Public Health Standards: 
Requirements for Programs, Services, and Accountability” document the expectations 
for the public health programs and services to be delivered by Ontario’s 34 public health 
units.  The Standards are published by the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care 
under the authority of the Health Protection and Promotion Act. 
Role of Public Health Units during Emergencies 
The first requirement of the Ontario Public Health Standard is in reference to 
Emergency Management.  Requirement 1 states “The board of health shall effectively 
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prepare for emergencies to ensure 24/7 timely, integrated, safe, and effective response 
to, and recovery from emergencies with public health impacts, in accordance with 
ministry policy and guidelines” (Ontario Ministry of Health an Long-Term Care, 2018).  
Roles included within this requirement include, but is not limited to health assessment, 
awareness, and surveillance; emergency planning; communication and notification; and 
learning and practice.  Within the ‘communication and notification’, there is a 
requirement that the board of health “shall identify and maintain a range of 
communication modes to ensure the dissemination of timely information (e.g. the 
Emergency Management Communications Tool, social media, news media)” (Ontario 
Ministry of Health an Long-Term Care, 2018).  The dissemination of information by the 
local public health unit as a requirement, especially during an emergency is clearly 
documented and legislatively required. 
The WHO ‘Framework for Action’ presented in Figure 2 shows the critical role of 
communication in influencing human behavior.  This ‘Framework for Action’ highlights 
five components: surveillance, healthcare response, public health intervention, 
communication and command.  As shown in the graph, if “command” is the local public 
health agency, they should use surveillance information (fundamental role of local public 
health unit) to inform their response.  Another standard response is health care 
response (e.g. providing assessment and testing).  The healthcare response helps to 
slow down the transmission at the societal level.  However, to influence slowing down of 
transmission at the individual level, local public health units should be providing 
adequate, clear and convincing communication messages.  Communication as a tool to 
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influence individual behavior  to slow down transmission is an important component of a 
public health emergency response. 
 
Figure 2: WHO Framework for Action for an Infectious Disease Outbreak Response  
(Craig et al., 2010) 
 
Public health emergencies are unexpected events which threaten human health with 
severe injury, mortality and morbidity, and which have impacts on the economy and the 
security and stability of the society, and which exceed the community’s capacity to deal 
with them (Glik, 2007).  Effective emergency management can help to mitigate the 
damage and help cope with and recover from these impacts.  (Petak, 1985) Effective 
outbreak management can prevent pandemics.  Indeed, SARS, MERS, H1N1, and re-
emergent of Ebola could have become pandemics without proper intervention (Gostlin, 
et al.).  The purpose of risk communication is to inform the public about possibilities and 




Renn (1991) defined risk as a possibility that arises from human behavior or events and 
has negative impacts on humans (Renn & Levine, 1991).   Risk communication 
considers stakeholders views and perceptions of risk.  It is an interactive process of 
exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups and institutions (Covella 
& Sandman, 2001).  Effective risk communication means populations that comply 
leading to overall improvement of health and poor risk communication leads to panic 
and chaos and can, as a result, lead to deaths.  For public health emergencies, risk 
communication includes preparedness, response, and recovery phases of a serious 
public health event to encourage informed decision making, positive behavior change, 
and the maintenance of trust (WHO, 2009).  The Toronto review of SARS responses 
mentioned that the inability to provide the right information to the affected people 
resulted in increasing their fears (Hawryluck, Lapinsky, & Stewart, 2005).   
The goals of risk communication include engagement/bidirectional communication, 
debunking myths/fact checking and establishing trust. 
Bidirectional Communication 
Bidirectional communication is an important goal of risk communication.  “Problems 
related to one-directional communication, lack of trust and relationships building 
between providers and people and between relevant professional sectors and 
stakeholders have been identified as high priority issues needing attention”  (Qiu, 2017) 
(Dickman, Apfel, & Gottschalk, 2016). 
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Data show that 67 percent of internet users participate in social networking sites, and 
Facebook, the most popular social media platform, reported 1.1 billion monthly active 
users in 2013 (Duggan & Brennar, 2013) (Heldman, Schindelar, & Weaver III, 2020). 
Debunking Myths/Correcting Misinformation 
Another goal of risk communication is to debunk myths and control misinformation.  
Especially with the rise of social media where anyone can share information, 
misinformation is common and easy to spread.  In relation to public health, if 
misinformation is not corrected, there can be severe consequences.  Factual 
elaboration from credible sources (e.g. government) can play a powerful role in risk 
communication.  Sharing correct information and debunking myths is a goal of risk 
communication.   
Establishing Trust 
The importance of collecting and disseminating accurate data plays a critical role in 
establishing citizen trust.  During SARS outbreak, the Chinese government’s inadequate 
disclosure of information was due in part to a lack of capacity to collect disease 
information (Wang, 2013).  Not providing information or providing wrong information 
leads to distrust by individuals.  If trust is not established, individuals will not take proper 
prevention measures and this leads to further outbreaks. (Smith, 2006) In the case of 
SARS, inaccurate information about the virus caused hospitals to provide the wrong 
medication and inappropriate prevention measures.   
15 
 
Gaps in Literature 
The literature talks about the role of public health during emergencies – including the 
important role of risk communication.  To what extent has public health leveraged the 
change and availability of technology in its role in engaging and establishing trust?  
Does the governance structure play a role in this difference?  A review of the literature 
found no studies that looked at the use of information communication channels, and 
specifically social media, by public health units and how these may be impacted by 
possible reasons such as administrative structure, urban/rurality, etc. 
Research Methodology 
Measuring and evaluating communication content, strategies, methods/activities, and 
effectiveness as the pandemic unfolds is complex.  The scope of variables involved is 
numerous to track and analyze with statistical certainty.  As this paper is being written 
during the pandemic, the data collection methods available to the author are limited.  
Thus, the paper limits its scope to describing communication content and 
methods/activities and exploring possible reasons why.   
Due to the nature of this research being exploratory in nature, a Grounded Theory (GT) 
approach was used.  Grounded Theory is frequently employed when conducting 
exploratory research and a hypothesis is not available for further exploration.  Grounded 
Theory allows for a systematic approach to comparative analysis and is conducted 
through an iterative process of collecting data with progressively refined 
coding/categorization in order to establish a theory, as shown in Figure 3. 
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A content analysis included reviewing publicly available content from public health units’ 
websites and social media channels for recurring themes.  As themes emerged (e.g. 
frequent referencing to content from other levels of government), the remaining public 
health units’ content being analyzed were assessed/coded/categorized based on the 
emerging theme.  From this emerging theme, theory was developed (e.g. message 
alignment to other levels of government).  All categories were created as objective as 
possible to increase reliability.  Examples of categories include ‘Data Content’ (e.g. a 
post that communicates data such as number of cases) and ‘Reference Provincial, 
Federal, or WHO’.   
 





Case Selection  
Initial high level comparison of methods was compared for all 34 public health units in 
Ontario.  A deeper content analysis was undertaken for 10 of the 34 public health units.  
A cross-section of the 34 public health units was chosen factoring in 
administrative/governance structure, urban vs rural, size, budget, geographical area as 
well as relative impact of COVID-19 (as known at this time).  While this is not a 
statistical sampling, it provides some values for qualitative comparison.  Figure 4 shows 
the current 34 public health boundaries with stars showing the 10 local public health 
units selected for content analysis. 
 




Data Collection  
Data collection for each public health unit included some information on organizational 
info (e.g. administrative structure, population, rural/urban, budget and funding sources), 
contextual information related to COVID-19 (e.g. # of cases, deaths, etc.) and various 
factors related to communication information (e.g. type and frequency of social media 
communication, availability of data/epidemiological information, role of addressing 
misinformation, how soon they responded to news/politically sensitive information etc.) 
For the deeper content analysis, two weeks of social media content was analyzed, 
specifically using Facebook posts.  The two weeks included one week early on in the 
pandemic in March – March 11 to March 17 – which includes both the World Health 
Organization declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic as well as Ontario declaring State 
of Emergency which initiated closing of all schools and various businesses and 
workplaces.  The second week observed was a week in June – June 10 to June 16.  
This week included the introduction of the concept of Social Bubbles in Ontario (up to 
10 individuals you can come in close contact with).  This week also included “phase 2” 
of re-opening for some areas and not others.  As previously stated, as COVID-19 
progressed, response and communication strategies changed from federal/provincial to 
local.  However, although the source of information changed, citizens received 
continuous information.  Looking at the two different weeks provides an opportunity to 






There are core organizational information that are variables in possible similarities and 
differences.  Notably, the administrative structure (autonomous vs regional/municipal), 
population, rural vs urban were considered.  Although budget and resources would have 
been useful considerations, the simple consideration of this being a State of Emergency 
means that many public health units exceeded their budget for pandemic spending.  In 
fact, Simcoe-Muskoka District Health Unit stated that they spent $7-million in costs to 
combat COVID-19 as of mid-June (Engel, 2020).   In addition, some public health units 
may have been able to use staff (including communication and public relations staff) 
from non-public health departments in the case of public health units tied to local 
governments.  This kind of information is not readily available. 
Contextual Information 
Numbers related to COVID-19 are provided as contextual information.  Specifically, rate 
per 100,000 is being used for analysis. 
Communication Information 
Numerous communications related information was used for analysis.  Using the 
Grounded Theory Approach, themes emerged including number of social interactions, 





The data collected was based on publicly available information only.  As such, some 
information may have been archived or deleted permanently.  It is also important to note 
that the results are used for comparison only and are not statistically significant.  
Results 
A summary of the results of the systematic content analysis are presented below.  Full 
data collections as well as analysis documents are attached in the appendix section.  
Social Media Channels 
Number of Social Media Channels used by public health units is shown below.  There is 
a range in the number of social media channels used within the 34 public health units.  
Figure 5 shows the number of social media channels used by local public health units in 
Ontario.  Two public health units only have two social media channels whereas some 
have 5 or more.  Although it was found that the content was generally the same 
amongst the different social media channels, the differences in channels may reach 
different audiences (e.g. Instagram users may prefer more picture-based content vs 
twitter users preferring words).  Multiple channels also provide the opportunity for 




Figure 5: Number of Social Media Channels used by Public Health Units 
 
Interactions/Citizen Engagement 
A key theme emerging from the literature on effective risk communication is the need for 
bidirectional communication.  Social Media provides that opportunity.  Social Media is, 
by definition social – “it is participatory and reciprocal, lending itself to conversations 
and interactions between and among a public health organization and its diverse 
audiences” (Heldman, Schindelar, & Weaver III, 2020).   Bidirectional communication 
can be gauged using number of interactions.  In this case, this includes total number of 
likes, comments, or shares.  The nature of internet and social media means that anyone 
in the world can interact (e.g. using likes/comments/views); it is not limited to individuals 
within the public health unit catchment area.  Also, the same user can interact in more 
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The number of interactions based on the collected Facebook data during the specified 
times (March and June) was further analyzed by administrative/governance structure, 
urban/rural, number of interactions per capita by COVID-19 rate, and over time (March 
vs June).  Results are shown in Figures 6-8 below. 
As Figure 6 shows, there appears to be a notable difference between autonomous and 
regional/single tier public health units in terms of number of interactions per capita.   
 
Figure 6: Number of Interactions per capita by Admin Structure 
 
Figure 7 shows Number of Interactions per capita by Rural/Urban.  Results show that 
local public health units servicing predominantly rural communities have the highest 
number of interactions per capita.  It also shows that public health units in the Greater 
Toronto Area have the least interactions.  While the number of interactions are equal, 
once the population that these public health units serve are factored in, the urban (GTA) 






























Figure 7: Number of Interactions per capita by Rural/Urban 
 
Figure 8 shows number of interactions per capita by COVID-19 Rate.  These findings 
show that public health units with high interaction are tied to low COVID-19 rates.   
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Figure 9 shows number of interactions per capita over time.  This shows that the time 




Figure 9: Number of Interactions per capita over Time 
 
Communicating Data 
Another theme that emerged from the data is communicating data.  Data about 
morbidity and mortality rates were communicated on a regular basis by the public health 
units. 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of Public Health Units using Interactive Dashboards.   
Interactive dashboards allow citizens to view information the way they want it to.  In 
addition, the use of these interactive dashboards (e.g. Tableau, PowerBI) typically also 





























Figure 10: Percentage of Public Health Units using Interactive Dashboards 
 
For the deep content analysis, average messages with data content in social media was 
observed by admin structure, urban vs rural, COVID-19 rate and over time.  Figure 11 
shows the difference in average messages with data content by admin structure.  This 








































Figure 12 shows that Urban (GTA) Public Health Units has more messages with data 
content than Public Health Units that serve mostly rural or rural/urban population. 
 
 
Figure 12: Data Content in Social Media Channel by Rural/Urban 
 
Figure 13 shows that there is on average even number of messages with data content 
amongst the various public health units when broken down by COVID-19 rate. 
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Figure 14 shows that average data content in social media channel increased between 
March and June. 
 
Figure 14: Data Content in Social Media Channel over Time 
 
Message Alignment with Other Levels of Government 
Another interesting theme that arose was referencing of content from other levels of 
government.  Again, this was observed by administrative structure, urban/rural, COVID-
19 rate and over time.   
Figure 15 shows that the content referencing is about the same between autonomous 
and regional/single tier.  Autonomous shows slightly higher frequency of referencing 

































Figure 15: Reference Content from Other Levels of Government by Admin Structure 
 
Figure 16 shows that there is about the same frequency among the public health units;  
Urban (GTA) public health units reference other levels of government less. 
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Figure 17 shows that there is about the same frequency among the public health units 
with differing COVID-19 rates, with those with over 300 COVID-19 rates per 100,000 
population showing slightly higher tendency to reference messages from other levels of 
government. 
 
Figure 17: Reference Content from Other Levels of Government by COVID-19 Rate 
 
Figure 18 shows that the frequency of referencing content from other levels of 
government stayed approximately stable over time between the observed periods of 




























COVID Rate per 100,000 population
(as of July 11, 2020)
Reference Content from Other Levels of 




Figure 18: Reference Content from Other Levels of Government over Time 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this research paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of how and why 
methods and content of communication practices across Ontario Public Health Units 
have differed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on themes emerging from the data 
collection, there was a range of findings related to bidirectional 
communication/engagement, using data to establish trust, and message alignment with 
other levels of government.  There were also noteworthy areas for which there was 
insufficient data to explore in detail. 
Bidirectional Communication/Engagement 
Effective risk communication requires an understanding of citizens’ perception of risk.  
As such, bidirectional communication is beneficial as it provides a method of feedback 
from the population it serves.  Using the number of interactions (measured by number of 
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that there is variation in bidirectional communication in autonomous public health units 
compared to those tied to regional.    
Results show variation in bidirectional communication (measured by interactions) in 
autonomous and regional, with more interaction in autonomous public health units.  This 
is in line with findings that autonomous health units are in a better position to pursue 
their legislative responsibilities than health units that are integrated into municipal 
structures, a finding confirmed by Lyons.  Lyons (2016) compared the spending 
between an autonomous and municipal-government integrated public health units and 
concluded that autonomous health units are better able to fulfil their mandate. 
Results also show variation in bidirectional communication in urban/rural with public 
health units with predominantly urban geographic areas showing less interaction. 
Results show that bidirectional communication is notably less in June than in March.  
This shows for the time period observed (week in March) had more interactions than 
later in the pandemic’s progression (week in June).  This may be in line with research 
findings that people reach a state of information or alert fatigue over time (Baseman, 
Revere, Painter, Toyoji, Thiede, & Duchin, 2013).   
Despite these overall variations, it is important to note that the number of interactions 
even among the higher numbers is very low.  In all the observed breakdowns, there is 
less than 1 interaction per 100,000 population during the time period observed.  With 
data showing that 67% of internet users participate in social networking sites with 1.1 
billion monthly active users worldwide, this small number is notably low. 
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Using Data to Establishing Trust 
Studies have shown that collecting accurate data and communicating it in a timely 
manner is necessary to establish trust.  Based on the results analyzed, average 
messages with predominantly data content is equal amongst the various breakdowns 
(by admin structure, urban/rural, COVID-19 rate, and over time).  Data visualization is a 
new, innovative way for citizens to interact with the data.  It appears that 15 of the 34 
public health units (or 44%) have interactive dashboards.  Interactive dashboards, by 
their nature, have data refreshed on a regular interval, and allow for citizens to interact 
with the data.  This enables citizens to find information that they are looking for without 
feeling overwhelmed.   
Public Health Units utilizing social media messages to conduct contact tracing was also 
observed, but for the time period observed, only 1 or 2 municipalities used social media 
for this purpose. 
Overall, although public health units appear to be communicating data in an acceptable 
way, there is room for improvement with more municipalities leveraging interactive 
dashboards and using social media for contact tracing purposes. 
Localized Responses Based on COVID-19 Prevalence 
Changes in communication characteristics based on COVID-19 prevalence rates was 
observed.  This speaks to the need for localized responses based on need.  Indeed, the 
role of location in messaging is widely known.  “Messages that provide information on 
specific geographic areas of impact or a defined population lead to increased perception 
of risk and increased probability of appropriate behavioral response” (Glik, 2007).  For 
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example, Windsor-Essex has a high number of migrant farmers.  Higher number of 
COVID-19 prevalence among the migrant farmers resulted in Windsor Essex having 
higher COVID-19 rates.  This required a different method and frequency of 
communication.  This was especially found as June approached and most of Ontario 
was moving to Stage 2 of re-opening; Windsor-Essex was required to stay in Stage 1.  
This type of specific communication based on characteristics of the geographical area it 
serves may be compromised by further amalgamation.  However, even if amalgamated, 
a localized response and subsequent communication strategy is necessary. 
Message Alignment with Other Levels of Government 
For the most part, most public health units’ messages appear to be in alignment with 
provincial and federal governments.  During the observed timeframe, most public health 
units referenced or re-shared at least one message or image from another level of 
government.  Consistent and repeated exposure to messages increases the 
effectiveness of the message being communicated.  Between the different 
administrative structures, autonomous PHUs appeared to be referencing the other 
levels of government more, although a big difference was not observed.  Between the 
rural/urban areas, again, a big difference was not observed, although rural PHUs 
appear to be referencing the other levels of government more than Urban (GTA) PHUs 
do.  A notable difference was not found among the COVID-19 rates or over time. 
Message alignment between local, provincial and federal government in Canada can be 
contrasted with contradictory and confrontational messaging in the United States.  For 
instance, the Georgia State government sued Atlanta city for issuing mandatory mask 
directives.  (Greenblatt, 2020)  The Trump administration refused to endorse or promote 
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the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s guidelines for re-opening the schools.  
Analysts have pointed to this as a major contributing factor for the worse COVID-19 
health outcomes in the United States. 
Areas Not Explored 
Although numerous themes emerged, some areas for exploration were not further 
explored as there were limited findings on the topic.  An example is public health 
authority’s role in debunking myths.  The local public health units’ websites provided 
frequently asked questions and repeated preventing messaging related to preventative 
measures messaging.  However, there was limited information on outright addressing of 
myths being circulated, such as “drinking disinfectants as a treatment for COVID-19” as 
proposed by United States President Donald Trump or the use of certain medication as 
a “cure” for COVID-19.  Although there is some literature that states repeating a myth is 
damaging by making the myth more familiar (Van der Meer & Jin, 2020), lack of such 
outright debunking of myths from local public health authorities was notable.  Similarly, 
there was limited data/content related to political influence in public health 
communication.  
Conclusion 
Content analysis included a systematic review of 10 of the 34 public health units’ 
websites and social media information.  Four communication-related themes emerged: 
engagement/bidirectional exchange with citizens, use of data to establish trust, localized 
response based on COVID-19 prevalence rates, and message alignment with other 
levels of government.  Findings show that some of this variation can be explained by 
35 
 
administrative structure (autonomous vs regional/single-tier), rural/urban environment 
and COVID-19 prevalence differences.  The data collected in this research shows that 
there is more interaction/bidirectional communication by autonomous units.  Conversely, 
less data content is being shared by these same units.  Local Public Health Units 
consistently used content from upper levels of government, which showed message 
alignment between local health units, provincial and federal government.  These 
findings do not unilaterally show autonomous public health units may be able to carry 
out their functions better.  However, the existence of variation amongst communication 
methods and content between differing administrative structures and varying rural/urban 
environments indicate that these factors have an important impact on communication. 
Recommendations 
The study compared the content and methods of communication practices.  Based on 
the findings, it appears that Ontario Public Health Units are not leveraging the 
availability of social media channels and this new opportunity for bidirectional 
communication methods for their functions such as contact tracing and debunking 
myths.  Although a minimal use of these innovative uses was found in social media in 
one or two of the Ontario Public Health Units observed, it should be noted that these 
new and now prevalent communication technologies can be used for this purpose. 
This study found that there are considerable differences in communication methods and 
content related to varying characteristics of a local public health unit including 
administrative structure, rural/urban environments and COVID-19 prevalence.  The case 
of Windsor-Essex having a higher COVID-19 prevalence and resulting unique 
communication response shows that a localized response is necessary.  As such, the 
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initiative to  amalgamate the 34 public health units into 10 needs to take into 
consideration the localized communication and response needs of the communities 
served by the local public health units.  Even if amalgamation proceeds, the need for 
localized response and communication strategy remains.  For instance, an 
amalgamated region or agency may consider using a targeted communication strategy 
to better serve local needs. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
As this research was being conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, only publicly 
available information was available to be used.  Further, as the pandemic did not 
conclude, it was difficult to identify all of the variables and results.  Future research can 
look at evaluating the effectiveness of these communication methods and content, and 
factors impacting them by expanding the data collection methods (e.g. surveys and 
semi-structured interviews) and sources. 
Data was collected manually for this research, which limited the scope (e.g. dates, 
categories, etc.).  Using an Application Programming Interface (API) to automatically 
collect data from social media (e.g. Twarc for Twitter), and using data analysis tools 
(e.g. python, voyant-tools.org) will enable this research to be conducted at a larger 
scale.  These tools will also support a statistical approach/methodology to the research 
questions posed in this study.  In addition, a deeper look at emerging communication 
methods beyond social media such as direct messaging (e.g. WhatsApp) and mobile 
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Appendix A: Data Collection 
Complete raw data collection is found in this attachment: 
2_Public_Health_.Unit
s_Analysis_Data_Colle 
Appendix B: Data Analysis 
Deep analysis of data including creation of graphs found in the results section is found 
in this attachment: 
2_Public_Health_Units
_Deep_Analysis.xlsx  
 
 
